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NEBULOUS LAW:
USING SOFT LAW TO GIVE STRUCTURE TO
THE AMORPHOUS RPO INDUSTRY
KYLIE MCLAUGHLIN†
INTRODUCTION
Imagine looking down at your smartphone and realizing
that you cannot make phone calls or access the internet.
A communications satellite enabling these functions on your
cellphone has just been struck by a piece of uncontrolled space
debris. Now, imagine being in the aftermath of a natural disaster,
and search and rescue teams do not know you and your family
are missing or in distress. A satellite within the International
Satellite System for Search and Rescue has just run out of fuel.
Finally, imagine trains, planes, and ships remaining in their
stations, gates, and ports because each has lost navigation data
about their intended routes. A GPS satellite was just disabled by
an antagonistic state’s anti-satellite technology.
While each of these scenarios is drastic to say the least, they
are not entirely unprecedented. Satellites control nearly every
facet of our technology-dependent society. Any given satellite
struck by space debris or low on fuel would create rippling
consequences throughout civilization. To combat such scenarios,
governments and companies may turn to rendezvous and
proximity operations (“RPOs”). RPOs have many capabilities, but
primarily, actors in space hope to use RPOs to remove space debris
and refuel satellites. These operations can alter and enhance
the landscape of technological advancements here on Earth.
Unfortunately, the same technology that is used in RPOs to clean
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up outer space or replenish a satellite’s fuel could also be used
to disable a satellite through anti-satellite operations. Such a
security risk is threatening the growth of the RPO industry,
which in turn threatens the growth of technology on Earth. To
exacerbate the situation, only vague and outdated treaties govern
outer space activities, none of which specifically address RPO rules
and regulations.
This Note argues that the nascent RPO industry should turn
to soft law measures to regulate RPO use because soft law is more
beneficial to the industry as compared to hard law. Part I of this
Note describes what exactly RPOs are and details why it is
important to regulate the industry in one form or another. This
Part also delves into which treaties currently control outer space
activities and discusses how these treaties are too broad to address
issues that may arise with RPO use. Lastly, this Part introduces
the major players of the RPO industry that are collaborating to
create a workable system of rules for the industry as a whole. Part
II of this Note details the differences between soft law and hard
law and addresses the advantages and disadvantages of using soft
law. It also analyzes the Kimberley Process, which is a soft law
method of addressing a major security issue resulting from the
Blood Diamond Regime in Southern Africa. Part III considers the
advantages and disadvantages of the RPO industry using soft law
to address its regulatory concerns and argues that soft law is more
beneficial to the RPO industry than hard law.
I.
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

What are RPOs?

RPOs are “orbital maneuvers in which two [space objects]
arrive at the same orbit and approach at a close distance,” which
can be followed by a docking procedure connecting the two space
objects.1 RPOs are not new to outer space activities. For example,
RPOs have been used to help the Apollo astronauts land on the
moon and transfer astronauts to and from space stations and space

1
REBECCA REESMAN & ANDREW ROGERS, THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
GETTING IN YOUR SPACE: LEARNING FROM PAST RENDEZVOUS AND PROXIMITY
OPERATIONS 2 (2018), https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/GettingInYour
Space.pdf.
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labs.2 New types of RPOs, such as on-orbit servicing and active
debris removal, have the potential to transform the commercial
and military landscape of outer space activities.
First, on-orbit servicing can include refueling and repairing
satellites.3 Traditionally, companies that design and launch
satellites had to deal with the fact that “their investments could
never be repaired or upgraded.”4 When a satellite runs out of fuel
or breaks down, the satellite is either sent to the graveyard orbit
22,400 miles above Earth or sent back to Earth.5 When it is sent
back to Earth, it either burns in Earth’s atmosphere or it drops
into the “Spacecraft Cemetery” of the Pacific Ocean.6 In the very
near future, however, satellite owners can use RPOs to inspect,
assist, and modify their on-orbit assets.7 This extends the life of
existing assets and adds more value to their initial investment.8
Refueling capabilities also give satellite owners the flexibility
to launch smaller or half-empty satellites.9 Launching with the
goal of refueling in the future grants cheaper access to space
because it is less expensive to launch a smaller or half-empty
satellite.10 RPOs ultimately will be used to drastically lower the
cost of constructing and deploying satellites, while also elongating
the lifespan of a satellite.11
Second, RPOs can be used to help remove debris cluttering
various orbits.12 “Active Debris Removal (ADR) is defined as the
‘means to remove objects from orbit above and beyond the

2
See Theresa Hitchens, Opening Remarks on Debris Removal/Rendezvous and
Proximity Operations: Looking at Policy Implications 1 (available on the Secure
World Foundation’s website, https://swfound.org/media/167942/openingremarks_
hitchens.pdf).
3
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1 at 2–3.
4
Todd Master, Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations
(CONFERS), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa.
mil/program/consortium-for-execution-of-rendezvous-and-servicing-operations (last
visited Feb. 20, 2020).
5
See Where Do Old Satellites Go When They Die?, NASA SPACE PLACE,
https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/spacecraft-graveyard/en/ (last updated June 28, 2019).
6
See id.
7
See Master, supra note 4.
8
See Benjamin B. Reed, On-orbit Servicing and Refueling Concepts, NASA
SATELLITE SERVICING CAPABILITIES OFFICE 7 (2015), https://asd.gsfc.nasa.gov/luvoir/
events/seminars/2015/Reed_ATLAST_17Jun2015.pdf.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
See Master, supra note 4.
12
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 3.
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currently-adopted mitigation measures.’ ”13 Active debris removal
can include removing defunct satellites or loose spacecraft
components before their orbits decay on their own.14 Also, on-orbit
servicing is considered a form of debris removal, since what “was
once technically non-functioning debris could be serviced back
to functionality, thus actively removing it from classification
as debris.”15
Debris removal is integral to continuing operations in space
and maintaining the safety and functionality of satellites.16
Numerous satellites have stopped functioning in Earth’s orbit and
experts often assume that collisions with space debris are to
blame.17 Private companies and governments alike rely on active
debris removal procedures to ensure their assets will function
properly on-orbit.18 Without active debris removal, the debris
orbiting Earth may become subject to the Kessler Syndrome, also
known as the Cascade Effect.19
The Kessler Syndrome hypothesizes that while debris initially
orbits as larger objects, collisions leading to more fragmentation of
debris will occur.20 Some experts take the dramatic view that this

13
Major Marc G. Carns, Consent Not Required: Making the Case that Consent is
Not Required Under Customary International Law for Removal of Outer Space Debris
Smaller Than 10cm2, 77 A.F. L. REV. 173, 202 (2017) (quoting J.-C. Liou, An Active
Debris Removal Parametric Study for LEO Environment Remediation, 47 ADVANCES
IN SPACE RES. 1865, 1865 (2011)).
14
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 3.
15
Carns, supra note 13, at 202; see also Martin J. Losekamm et al., Legal and
Political Implications of Future On-Orbit Servicing Missions, INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL
FED’N 1, 3 (2015) (“A servicing spacecraft . . . may . . . refuel satellites that ran out of
fuel but are otherwise functional, so that they regain their station-keeping and
collision-avoidance capabilities.”).
16
See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 306 (Routledge,
1st ed. 2016).
17
See id. at 306 n.131; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 3 (“A servicing
spacecraft could be used to deorbit larger pieces of debris, thereby reducing the
probability of major future collisions.”).
18
See Justin Moor, Note, “You’re Not Actually Going Into an Asteroid Field?” –
The Threat of Man-Made Space Debris, and a Proposal to Extend Existing Law to
Prevent It, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 245, 255–57 (2014). “Satellite telecommunications
companies comprise a $180 billion-dollar-per-year global industry, and therefore
damage to satellites could have major economic consequences. Apart from the loss of
corporate revenues, losing telecom satellites harms the people who rely on them both
in their career and in their lives.” Id. at 255. “Satellites are vital to modern military
intelligence-gathering and navigation. Satellite-powered GPS guidance is vital to
ensuring that guided missiles and bombs hit their targets.” Id. at 256.
19
See id. at 257.
20
See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637, 2637 (1978);
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will eventually lead to “an impenetrable cloud of fragmentation
debris that will encase Earth.”21 If this comes to fruition, such a
cloud of debris could make space travel nearly impossible.22
However, the Kessler Syndrome is more likely to result in less
severe, but still dire, consequences.23 Such consequences include
heightened costs to satellite owners to undertake “collision
avoidance maneuvers” to save their assets.24 The United States
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”)
reported that the International Space Station needed to take
avoidance measures twenty-five times by 2015.25 Further, the
European Space Association reported that “one of its ten [low
Earth orbit] satellites receive[s] a ‘high-risk collision alert every
week on average’ ” and must maneuver away from the hazards at
least once or twice each year.26 These collision avoidance measures
require satellites to expend fuel that they cannot replenish under
existing technology.27 RPOs, of course, could be used to refuel
satellites after these maneuvers.28 RPOs could also preempt the
need to refuel satellites in such situations by clearing enough
debris, thereby limiting the need to perform avoidance
maneuvers.29
Despite the benefits of using RPOs to repair and refuel
satellites and clear debris, there are many issues that can arise
with the use of RPOs. Primarily, actors in space are concerned
with security risks.
“Widespread use of rendezvous and
proximity operations is a concern for the national security
community because the technologies and operational techniques

see also Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a
Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 132 (2000).
21
Sundahl, supra note 20; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 3 (“[The
Kessler syndrome] would render large portions of the currently populated orbital
bands unusable once the rate of debris creation exceeds that of natural atmospheric
cleansing.”).
22
See Moor, supra note 18, at 257.
23
See Humaid Alshamsi et al., As the Grapefruit Turns Sixty, It’s Time to Get
Serious About Clean Up in Outer Space, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 45, 51–52 (2018).
24
Id. at 51 (quoting Two More Collision Avoidance Maneuvers for the
International Space Station, ORBITAL DEBRIS QUARTERLY NEWS, Oct. 2015, at 1).
25
See id. (citing Two More Collision Avoidance Maneuvers for the International
Space Station, supra note 24).
26
Id. (quoting Space Debris Problem Getting Worse, Say Scientists,
PHYS.ORG (Apr. 18, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-04-space-debris-problemworse-scientists.html).
27
Id. at 62.
28
Id. at 52–53.
29
See id. at 51, 53.
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are essentially the same as those needed for anti-satellite (ASAT)
operations.”30 An ASAT “weapon destroys or interferes with
satellites, impeding a nation’s ability to collect intelligence or
direct attacks.”31 Many states rely on satellites for military and
civilian purposes, creating a vulnerability for rivals to prey upon.32
“Potential adversaries, aware of the technology patterns of the
United States (and other [states]), have come to appreciate the
suggestion that satellites may now be the Achilles heel of the
American civilian economy and its mighty military apparatus.”33
An attack on such satellites could cripple a state’s military
prowess and civilian economy, quickly granting the attacker a
“crippling advantage.”34
RPOs are essential in ensuring satellites can be repaired and
refueled and are integral in removing hazardous space debris.35
The future of space travel will be altered greatly with the use of
RPOs.36 But the security risks associated with RPO use could
potentially hinder the growth of this industry.37 Thus, it is
imperative that the international community create rules and
regulations governing the use of RPOs in outer space.38
B. Lack of International Regulations for the RPO Industry
Currently, there are various international treaties regulating
space activities generally, but none of the treaties specifically
address RPOs.39 There are five treaties concerning outer space
regulation: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue Agreement
of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, the Registration
Convention of 1976, and the Moon Treaty of 1979. Only two of

30

JAMES A. VEDDA & PETER L. HAYS, THE MITCHELL INST. FOR AEROSPACE
STUDIES & THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, MAJOR POLICY ISSUES IN EVOLVING
GLOBAL SPACE OPERATIONS 44 (2018), https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/201805/Space_Policy_FINAL_interactive_0.pdf.
31
See Carin Zissis, China’s Anti-Satellite Test, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Feb 22, 2007), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test.
32
See David A. Koplow, The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in
Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT’L L. J. 331, 337 (2018) (“Over time, therefore, the modern
‘use’ of satellites has evolved into a ‘reliance’ upon them, which has graduated into a
‘dependence,’ and eventually generated a ‘vulnerability.’ ”).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 2–3.
36
See id. at 10.
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5.
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these five have the potential to regulate RPO use in a general
sense: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Liability
Convention of 1972.40
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 contains various articles that
can potentially be applied to RPO use.41 First, Article VI orders
that “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, . . . whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities.”42
Further, Article VI dictates
that “[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space . . . shall require authorization and continuing supervision
by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”43 Under this article,
it is likely that a certain state would be required to take
international responsibility for any mishaps during an operation
and that RPO usage would have to be approved and supervised by
such state.44
Second, Article VIII maintains that “[a] State Party to the
Treaty on whose registry an object is launched into outer space is
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object . . . .”45
This provision “grants perpetual ownership of space objects to
their launching state, even after the objects are deactivated and
become uncontrolled junk.”46 In order to remove debris from
Earth’s orbit, RPO industry members will likely have to get
permission from the launching state of every piece of debris in
outer space before removing it.47 “This would make removal efforts
even more costly and time-consuming, and possibly transform
such efforts into another arena for international politics.”48

40

See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4; see also Losekamm et al., supra
note 15, at 5.
41
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4; see also Losekamm et al., supra
note 15, at 5.
42
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
43
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. VI.
44
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4.
45
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. VIII.
46
VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 30, at 22.
47
See Moor, supra note 18, at 264–65.
48
Moor, supra note 18, at 265–66 (“A country could, for instance, only allow other
states to remove its space debris if they made certain political concessions.”).
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Third, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty dictates:
A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer
space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space . . . may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.49

The treaty does not define the term “harmful interference,”
and there is no generally accepted definition of this term.50
However, Article IX could apply to RPOs because the technologies
for RPO use are the same as those needed for ASAT operations.51
States would likely consider ASAT operations to constitute
“harmful interference” for the purposes of interpreting the Outer
Space Treaty.52 Thus, if any state thought that another state’s
RPO was being used for an anti-satellite purpose, it would likely
act pursuant to this article and request consultation. “Without
[such] diplomacy, it is not always easy to differentiate normal
operations . . . from precursors to war.”53 However, this clause
“does not provide a veto over any state’s activities; rather, it simply
requires ‘consultations.’ ”54 Not all hope is lost though; if a state
anticipated a potentially harmful interference by another state, it
could invoke Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which
requires Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force
against another state.55
Fourth, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty declares that a
state that launches or procures the launching of an object into
outer space (the “launching State”)56 is liable for the object or its

49

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. IX.
See Christopher D. Williams, Comment, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1156 (1995).
51
VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 30, at 44.
52
See Williams, supra note 50, at 1157.
53
SAMUEL BLACK, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
WITH SPACE OBJECTS: THE KEY TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING 2 (2008).
54
Williams, supra note 50, at 1157.
55
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.”).
56
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art.
I, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention]; (defining a “launching State” as “[a] State which launches or
procures the launching of a space object” or “[a] State from whose territory or facility
a space object is launched”).
50
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component parts in air or in outer space.57 Additionally, the
Liability Convention of 1972 “expand[ed] upon the principles of
liability for damage caused by space objects introduced in Article
VII.”58 For example, Articles II, III, and V of the Liability
Convention expand the potential liability of “launching States” by
establishing that they are strictly liable for all accidents on the
surface of the Earth.59 Also, Article IV of the Liability Convention
uses fault-based liability for accidents not occurring on the surface
of the Earth.60
Mishaps involving RPOs would likely be
covered by Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability
Convention, but again, neither treaty specifically addresses
these operations.61
These two treaties, along with the three other international
treaties regulating space activities, were “originally created with
state civilian or military actors in mind and therefore lack[]
the specificity and legal certainty that is necessary for
mature commercial activities.”62 Private actors and private space
activities were not anticipated when these treaties were
introduced and adopted.63 Specifically, the Outer Space Treaty is

57
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 42, at art. VII (“Each State Party to the
Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State
Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies.”); see also REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4.
58
REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4.
59
See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at arts. II, III & V; Adrian Taghdiri,
Note, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight Industry: The
Inadequacy of Current International Law to Address the Opportune Registration of
Space Vehicles in Flag States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405, 412–13 (2013); see also
Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5 (“Articles II, III, and V of the Liability Convention
state that the state actors launching an object into outer space shall jointly retain
absolute liability for any damage caused on Earth, to aircraft, or to a space object of
another launching state.”).
60
See Liability Convention, supra note 56, at art. IV; see also Taghdiri, supra note
59, at 412–13; Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5 (“According to Article IV, in the
event of ‘damage being caused […] to a space object of one launching state […] by a
space object of another launching State, and of damage thereby being caused to a third
State […], the first two States shall be jointly and severally liable’ only if the damage
was caused culpably.” (alterations in original)).
61
See REESMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 4.
62
Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5.
63
See id.; David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as
the “Province of All Mankind,” 25 YALE J. INT’L. L. 145, 157 (2000) (“The five space
treaties were not formulated to address, and did not foresee, the complex problems of
space pollution we face in the twenty-first century.”).
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“a product of the Cold War and primarily addresses concerns of
that era, including nuclear war.”64 The treaty’s entire existence
“has prevented belligerent nations from putting weapons of mass
destruction into space.”65
Because all the relevant international law regulating space
activities was not created with private actors in mind, it is
questionable if these treaties can effectively regulate private space
activities such as RPOs.66
Ideally, modern international
treaties could be enacted to regulate the private sector.
However, multilateral treaties require a long, arduous process of
decision-making among a growing number of space-faring states.67
This lowers the likelihood of a new treaty being created or
of new provisions being added to existing treaties.68 Further,
technological advancements by the private sector consistently
outpace the rate at which international agreements can be
enacted.69 “[T]he lack of clear, widely accepted technical and
safety standards for responsible performance of on-orbit activities
involving commercial satellites” presents a major roadblock to this
industry.70 Absent such regulation, the future of outer space
operations is in jeopardy.71

64
Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can It Survive the New Space
Race?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
outer_space_treaty.
65
Id.; see also Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 6 (“Possible interpretations of
existing treaties and agreements constitute legal barriers that present a hindrance to
the evolution of the global space community in general, and the private sector in
particular.”)
66
See Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 5; see also Brian Weeden et al.,
International Perspectives on On-orbit Servicing and Active Debris Removal and
Recommendations for a Sustainable Path Forward, SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 6–8
(Sept. 2013), https://swfound.org/media/119604/iac-13-e3.4.7-presentation.pdf.
67
See Losekamm et al., supra note 15, at 8.
68
See id. (“The discrepancies of political perspectives, and the required consensus
in the decision-making process of COPOUS, make it almost impossible for its member
states to agree on new provisions [for treaties]. The growing number of participating
states exacerbates this situation even more.”).
69
See id. at 9; Jeff Foust, Trump Administration Continues Support of Outer
Space Norms of Behavior, SPACENEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://spacenews.com/trumpadministration-continues-support-of-outer-space-norms-of-behavior/; see also Debra
Werner, DARPA To Establish Satellite-Servicing Consortium to Discuss On-Orbit
Repair Standards, SPACENEWS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://spacenews.com/darpa-toestablish-satellite-servicing-consortium-to-discuss-on-orbit-repair-standards/.
70
Master, supra note 4.
71
See id.
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C. Major Players Working to Resolve Issues with RPO Use
To compensate for a lack of relevant international law and to
overcome these property and security concerns, private and public
actors are collaborating to create a more uniform system of
normative behavior regarding private space activity and RPOs
specifically.72 One such actor is the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (“DARPA”), which is “an advanced-technology
branch of the U.S. Department of Defense.”73 “The purpose of the
agency is to try out new technologies and make them operationally
ready, if possible, and to reach beyond current military technology
to do something new.”74
DARPA has organized the Consortium for Execution of
Rendezvous and Servicing operations, called CONFERS.75 The
goal of this organization is to “bring[] together companies involved
in satellite servicing to define best practices and develop voluntary
consensus-driven standards” for RPO missions.76 Using the best
practices from both government and industry leaders, CONFERS
will research, develop, and publish nonbinding technical and
safety standards for the RPO industry.77 These standards will
likely be adopted by servicing providers and clients for on-orbit
servicing operations.78 “[This] program would provide a clear
technical basis for definitions and expectations of responsible
behavior in outer space.”79
However, such goals require transparency about “engineering
and design criteria, operational issues and information sharing
practices for proximity operations and satellite servicing.”80 “Data
exchange, while essential for these activities, will pose challenges
due to national export controls and corporate concerns about
protecting proprietary information . . . .”81
DARPA hopes to
protect commercial participants’ financial and strategic interests
by making the standards broad enough to allow companies to
72

See Debra Werner, DARPA Working Group Begins Addressing Concerns
Related to Proximity Operations and Satellite Servicing, SPACENEWS (May 23, 2018),
https://spacenews.com/darpa-group-addresses-security-concerns/.
73
See Elizabeth Howell, What Is DARPA?, SPACE.COM (Apr. 30, 2015),
www.space.com/29273-what-is-darpa.html.
74
Id.
75
See Werner, supra note 72.
76
Id.; see also Master, supra note 4.
77
See Master, supra note 4.
78
See id.
79
Id.
80
See Werner, supra note 72.
81
Id.
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implement them “to suit their individual businesses.”82
By creating consensus-driven standards, CONFERS can reduce
the financial, regulatory, and diplomatic risks associated with
RPO use.83
In conjunction with DARPA, industry leaders are
collaborating through CONFERS to ensure that there is a more
uniform set of norms for RPO missions: Advanced Technology
International is the CONFERS prime contractor working to
coordinate and execute the most innovative research initiatives
surrounding RPO technology;84 “Secure World Foundation directs
outreach and engagement”;85 “USC’s Engineering Research Center
is investigating existing standards and practices”;86 and “[t]he
Space Infrastructure Foundation leads efforts to create new
standards.”87 These efforts by DARPA and other industry leaders,
again, are only creating best practices standards upon which the
industry can rely. These standards are not legally binding and
offer no recourse for any actors that stray from such norms—the
standards are voluntary.88 CONFERS realizing its end goal
hinges on the space-faring community accepting soft law measures
as opposed to implementing treaties—or other hard law measures.
II. THE SOFT LAW APPROACH
A.

What is Soft Law?

When interpreting and applying international law, there are
two different types of law to consider: hard law and soft law.89 The
Outer Space Treaty is an example of hard law—a law negotiated
and created between space-faring states to prevent Cold War
antics from reaching outer space.90 Soft law, on the other hand, is
82
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a means of further explaining vague concepts in a treaty and
“giving more direction on interpreting and renovating the hard
law.”91 Essentially, it is a set of principles and policies established
by various actors to deal with specific issues that hard law has
not settled.92
Unlike hard law, soft law does not limit the power to enter
into international agreements to state actors alone.93 Nonstate
actors, such as businesses and industry leaders, may be involved
with creating soft law. Also, soft law differs from hard law in that
actors opting for soft law alternatives do not intend to be bound by
international law.94
Rather, soft law “create[s] imprecise
obligations under which a wide range of activity might be
considered compliant.”95 Scholars also consider soft law as an
instrument used to “represent promises that . . . create
expectations about future conduct.”96
Sometimes, soft law serves as a placeholder in the
development of international law, which can later turn into
treaties.97 Because treaty-making is a difficult and lengthy
endeavor, soft law is often a suitable alternative under which
industry actors and states can operate for the time being.98
Further, “[a]lthough soft law is nonbinding, it may lead to
compliance with its standards . . . [which] gives rise to new
customary international law rules.”99 Customary international
law is comprised of two elements: general and consistent practice
by states—state practice, and practice followed out of a belief of
legal obligation—opinio juris.100 “[C]ustom is generally binding
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except for the limited and contentious persistent objector rule.”101
In the form of customary international law, soft law can become
binding on the international community.102 Thus, soft law has the
potential to be as obligatory as hard law.103
B. Advantages of Soft Law
Because soft law is such a flexible system, there are many
benefits to having soft law influence international law. First and
foremost, creating hard law is becoming a less attractive goal.104
“[M]any countries do not support the creation of new treaties on
[outer space regulation].”105
The United Nations’s Legal
Subcommittee is not likely to start making new treaties governing
outer space because it wants to avoid debates on already-decided
issues and the long process of treaty-making.106 Also, “it may be
easier for some states to adhere to nonbinding instruments
because they can avoid the domestic treaty ratification process,
and perhaps escape democratic accountability . . . for the policy to
which they have agreed.”107 Thus, when there is a lack of political
will to create treaties, soft law can be used to create principles and
policies in a given subject area.
Second, many non-space-faring nations have not signed on to
existing treaties governing outer space, despite the importance of
international harmony with respect to the law.108 Those treaties
were drafted to “focus on traditional space security concerns,
which are different from the critical security concerns today.”109
Thus, the nonsigning states do not see the upside of being legally
bound to such outdated treaties.110 On the contrary, using “soft
law instruments enables states to agree to more detailed and
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precise provisions because their legal commitment, and the
consequences of any non-compliance, are more limited.”111 Thus,
nonbinding soft law may be the only way to create a uniform set of
rules for every nation to follow—even non-space-faring nations, if
and when they enter outer space.112
Third, “soft law is a better way to handle the always-changing
technology that will undoubtedly be used in outer space.”113 Under
a soft law regime, technological advancements will not be deterred
or slowed due to the need to comply with a binding treaty.114 State
and nonstate actors can be more ambitious with technology and
engage in deeper cooperation with other actors than they would if
they had to worry about enforcement.115 “Soft law instruments
provide greater flexibility for states to cope with uncertainty [with
technology] and learn over time.”116 Soft law ultimately helps spur
creativity within industries involved in outer space technology.117
Fourth, both state and nonstate actors are able to participate
in creating soft law principles. Any effective regulatory strategy
must respond to the affected community’s concerns by “reacting
quickly and appropriately whe[n] new information comes to
light.”118 In order to react quickly and appropriately to new
information, the private enterprises of the community need to be
involved in the regulatory scheme.119 State-centered regulations
often can be ineffective because private enterprises hold much of
the information about and expertise in new technology rather than
111
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the state.120 For regulations to be effective, there needs to be
information sharing between state and nonstate actors, which
such actors can achieve more easily under a soft law regime—hard
law only requires state actors to be involved.121
Ultimately, soft law is an adaptable way to manage both state
and nonstate actors operating in outer space. Soft law limits the
need for hard law, given the difficulties associated with
treaty-making, the technological changes associated with outer
space activities, and the necessity of having nonstate actors
involved in policy-making. That is not to say, however, that soft
law does not come with its own disadvantages.
C. Disadvantages of Soft Law
While beneficial in many instances, soft law lacks many
aspects that make hard law more attractive to actors in outer
space. First, soft law lacks credibility.122 Hard law requires
codification of legally-binding obligations to which states subject
themselves.123 Treaties, in particular, show the international
community that the signing states intend to commit themselves to
the agreement.124 “They make state commitments more credible
because they increase the cost of reneging, whether on account of
legal sanctions or on account of the costs to a state’s reputation
where it is found to have violated its legal commitments.”125
Further, treaties can either be self-executing, meaning that
they have direct legal effects on national jurisdictions, or
non-self-executing, meaning that they require domestic legal
enactment.126 “Where treaty obligations are implemented through
domestic legislation, they create new tools that mobilize domestic
actors, increasing the audience costs of a violation and thus
making their commitments more credible.”127 Thus, state and
nonstate actors can be in breach of international obligations
created by hard law, making it more credible than soft law.
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Second, soft law lacks enforcement and punishment
mechanisms.128 Under soft law, there usually are no means of
enforcing the “law” and no means of punishing actors who violate
the “law.”129 While actors involved with soft law mechanisms can
bring problems and conflicts before an independent third party,
this conciliatory method is non-binding.130 Oftentimes, hard law
instruments allow states to bring disputes over their legal
commitments to a dispute-settlement body such as a court, which
is binding.131 Thus, hard law is much more enforceable than
soft law.
D. Soft Law in Practice: The Kimberley Process
It is important to understand how soft law works when it is
implemented in response to a major security issue. One such
example of this situation is the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds. Prior to the Kimberley Process,
diamonds were “the currency and primary financing vehicle of
rebel movements that brutalized innocent civilians.”132 By the
1990s, the unregulated trade of diamonds was financing rebel
groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Sierra Leone.133 In these countries, the rebel groups remained in
control of the diamond mining regions.134 These groups used the
proceeds to pay for weapons to wage “decades-long campaigns
against unarmed civilians, perpetrating killings, rapes,
mutilations, and abductions into their armies or sexual slavery.”135
Over ten million people were killed or displaced due to these
diamond-financed conflicts.136
In response to these atrocities, various state and nonstate
actors came together to address the problem of so-called “blood
diamonds,”137 or “conflict diamonds.” This coalition was comprised
of countries in Southern Africa, companies involved in the
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diamond trade, and human rights non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”).138 The African nations sought to quell the
violence and salvage the diamond trade, the companies sought to
avoid the boycott and collapse of the diamond industry, and the
NGOs sought to focus public attention on the matter.139 “Rather
than wholly ban the diamond trade, this group initiated the
Kimberley Process, a global certification scheme designed to drive
blood diamonds off the legal market.”140
Generally, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is
meant to bring together key stakeholders in the diamond trade,
identify universal human rights goals for the trade, and
devise a procedure by which these goals can be realized and by
which the stakeholders can still profit from the industry.141
Specifically, the institution supports the national regulation of
diamonds based on minimum standards that have been
internationally agreed upon.142 “All state participants must
ensure that every raw diamond shipment contains a Kimberley
Process certificate and that no shipment is imported from
or exported to a non-participant.”143 Each participating state
is expected to establish “a system of internal controls;
utilize tamper-resistant containers; enact implementing and
enforcement legislation; . . . share import and export data;” and
“self-report on [its] relevant laws, regulations, and practices.”144
Also, the process allows for nonstate actors—specifically
companies and NGOs—to engage in voluntary self-regulation
initiatives.145 This includes industry efforts to provide a warranty
system where members commit to not knowingly buying or selling
or helping others to buy or sell conflict diamonds.146 “The
[Kimberley Process] does not constitute a binding international
treaty; rather, it is more akin to an international political
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agreement between nations, and thus, is largely self-enforced.”147
As a soft law measure, the Kimberley Process provides a suitable
platform on which the advantages and disadvantages of soft law
can be examined more closely.
Overall, the Kimberley Process is often lauded as “an
exemplar for international action on humanitarian and security
problems.”148 From the perspective of the diamond and jewelry
industry, this process provides a sense of assurance that they are
not selling conflict diamonds to their customers.149 Such a sense
of assurance arises from the legitimacy of the process itself.150 The
process was created by industry leaders, which implies that the
process is practical and workable.151 “Unlike international arms
embargoes or sanctions, which typically are created by states
without the express involvement of the arms industry, the
Kimberley Process’s legitimacy lies in large part with the fact that
it is a product of the global diamond industry itself.”152
Further, the Kimberley Process involves other measures that
increase its legitimacy and efficacy. First, participant states are
obligated to “enact domestic legislation allowing for the imposition
of the terms of the Kimberley Process, which will combat conflict
diamonds within the participant’s jurisdiction.”153
Second,
participant states can be delisted for violating the terms of the
Kimberley Process.154 Being delisted means that diamonds cannot
be legally imported or exported through the state, which, in turn,
hurts the violating state’s economy. 155
Further, the public punishment for violating the process
incentivizes compliance by state and nonstate actors.156 After a
state has been delisted, it can be reinstated once the particular
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delisting issue has been resolved.157 This practice shows that the
creators of the Kimberley Process are devoted to solving the
inherent problem of conflict diamonds.158
Despite the advantages of the soft law approach applied to the
problem of conflict diamonds, the Kimberley process also presents
some disadvantages. The main issue with the process is that it
relies too much on the states’ and companies’ ability to police
themselves.159 Although the United Nations supports the creation
and implementation of the Kimberley Process, there is no
international monitoring body, meaning there are no legally
binding compliance standards.160
The only truly binding
requirements of the Kimberley Process are the pieces of domestic
legislation passed by participating states.161 But even that
legislation can experience sporadic enforcement by the
participating state, unless the state is committed to monitoring
through its domestic police power.162 This results in “inadequate,
‘toothless’ monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are
fundamentally flawed and ultimately ineffectual.”163 Scholars
have argued for more oversight from and participation by the
United Nations.164 The United Nations would have the power to
sanction states that do not comply with the process, giving the
Kimberley Process more teeth.165
In connection with the lack of international oversight, the
process “does not permit a private right of action whereby an
individual can bring suit against another person or company
violating the [Kimberley Process].”166 Such a private right of
action would allow members of the industry to “more actively
participate in the prevention of the blood diamond trade.”167 It
would also create another “check” on the system.168 Lastly, the
private right of action would deter people in the industry from
157
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buying or selling conflict diamonds.169 It would serve as an
incentive for participating states to stay committed to the
Kimberley Process.170
Overall, the Kimberley Process has mitigated many human
rights abuses in the diamond industry. As a soft law measure, the
process has largely proved to be effective against such a major
security issue, despite some disadvantages that may need to be
addressed in the future. The Kimberley Process’s advantages and
disadvantages are applicable to the RPO industry because both
situations involve security issues affecting both state and nonstate
actors. Thus, the RPO industry can reap the benefits of the soft
law approach and preemptively address its drawbacks.
III. ARGUMENT: SOFT LAW TO REGULATE THE RPO INDUSTRY
A.

Advantages of Using Soft Law to Regulate RPOs

Soft law may be the best option to regulate RPO use because
it is a more flexible system compared to hard law. First, creating
hard law is becoming a less attainable goal because many
countries do not support the creation of new treaties regulating
outer space activities.171 Further, the United Nations wants
to avoid treaty negotiations because they can be very
time-consuming and because states may want to renegotiate terms
of prior treaties regulating outer space.172 With CONFERS using
soft law to regulate RPOs, there is no need to create or negotiate
any new treaty. Actors involved with RPOs could still operate
under existing treaties, while using soft law instruments created
by CONFERS to interpret vague terms of the existing treaties.173
Also, states will more readily agree to soft law measures because
agreeing to non-binding measures has fewer political
ramifications domestically than binding hard law.174 Thus,
the lack of political will to create a new treaty will not prevent
CONFERS and other actors from regulating RPOs with soft
law measures.
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Second, various non-space-faring states are not signatories to
existing treaties governing outer space.175 The five treaties
governing outer space were drafted in the Cold War era, when
different security concerns existed than those that states are
focused on today.176 The nonsigning states are not inclined to be
legally bound to such outdated laws.177 Thus, soft law measures
may be the only method of creating uniformity in RPO regulation.
Space-faring and non-space-faring states can benefit from
CONFERS creating soft law principles because such principles can
be precise and detailed, compared to broad and vague treaties.178
Third, soft law is a more effective way to handle the
technological advancements associated with space activities.179
With each new technological advancement, a state or nonstate
actor might violate the terms of a binding treaty, unless new terms
are drafted. Acknowledging how difficult it is to create a treaty or
renegotiate the terms of an existing treaty, hard law may stifle the
RPO industry’s motivation to advance technology. Under soft law
measures, however, rules and regulations can be more easily
adapted in light of new technology, and there is no penalty for
“violating” soft law policies.180 This means that RPO industry
members can defy soft law measures without fear of retribution
when they develop new technology.181 CONFERS is currently led
by DARPA, whose sole purpose is to create new technology for
the United States military.182 CONFERS’s prime contractor is
Advanced Technology International (“ATI”), which is working to
coordinate and execute the most innovative research initiative
surrounding RPO technology.183 These two actors are leading the
charge for technological advancements regarding RPOs and
CONFERS is enabling them to collaborate to push technological
boundaries.184 Further, CONFERS’s policies can be altered as
175
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technology changes because DARPA and ATI are two of the key
policy-making actors within CONFERS.185 Soft law allows actors
like DARPA and ATI to learn and experiment with technology
without fear of penalty for violating policies.186
Fourth, soft law allows nonstate actors to play an integral
role in policy-making alongside state actors.187 For the most part,
private enterprises have more information and expertise on
new technology than state actors.188 Open communication and
collaboration between state and nonstate actors are essential to
the creation of effective regulations.189 CONFERS is the primary
channel through which state actors, like DARPA, can collaborate
with nonstate actors, like ATI, to create policies that facilitate
technological growth.190 CONFERS has also recruited the Secure
World Foundation to direct outreach to other actors to engage
them in policy-making, University of Southern California’s
Engineering Research Center to investigate current standards
and practices surrounding RPO regulation, and the Space
Infrastructure Foundation to lead efforts to create new
standards.191 CONFERS, acting as a soft law platform, will likely
produce effective policies and procedures that will be respected
throughout the RPO industry because they will be created by the
industry itself.192
Overall, soft law is a malleable tool to give structure to the
RPO industry. CONFERS allows state and nonstate actors to
collaborate and create policies and procedures that reflect the best
practices of the RPO industry while inspiring technological
growth. Soft law is likely the preferred method of the industry
given the lack of political will to create new treaties or for
non-space-faring states to sign on to existing treaties. While soft
law is the advantageous method of creating regulations, it does
have disadvantages that need to be addressed.
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B. Disadvantages of Using Soft Law to Regulate RPOs
While it is likely the preferred method of regulation for the
RPO industry, soft law lacks many features of hard law that may
make a treaty more attractive to actors in outer space. First, one
of the main features soft law lacks is credibility.193 Hard law
requires codifying legally-binding obligations to which states
subject themselves, showing that they intend to be bound by the
terms of the agreement.194 Treaties make state commitments more
credible because a breach would likely lead to sanctions or harm
to the reneging state’s reputation.195 Further, nonstate actors can
be in breach of a treaty if the treaty is self-executing, or if it’s
non-self-executing but domestic legislation has been passed
pursuant to the treaty.196
However, in some circumstances, soft law can become binding
customary international law.197 Customary international law is
composed of state practice, which is a general and consistent
practice by states, and opinio juris, which is a practice followed out
of a belief of legal obligation.198 Once a soft law practice has been
deemed to be so consistent and widely-practiced that it is now
considered customary international law, it is as legally-binding
and obligatory on state actors as a treaty.199 If CONFERS creates
policies that enough space-faring states follow out of a sense of
legal obligation, these policies can be obligatory customary
international law on state actors. Thus, soft law, in the form of
customary international law regulating RPO use, eclipses the need
and desire for a treaty on RPOs.
However, customary international law is not binding
on nonstate actors. CONFERS can counteract this issue by
implementing the delisting procedure as seen in the Kimberley
Process.200 Where a nonstate actor forgoes soft law rules and
regulations of RPO use, it can be delisted as a participating entity
with CONFERS. This would hurt the violator’s finances because
fewer satellite owners would want to do business with that violator
if they are not following protocol. The economic incentive to
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comply with soft law is comparable to the legal incentive to comply
with hard law, making soft law as credible as a treaty. Thus, soft
law is an effective way to regulate RPO use.
Second, soft law lacks enforcement and punishment
mechanisms. Under soft law, there often are no means of
enforcing the “law” and no means of punishing actors who violate
the “law,” while hard law instruments allow states to bring
disputes over their legal commitments to a dispute-settlement
body.201 Thus, hard law tends to be more enforceable than soft law.
However, CONFERS can use other methods to enforce policies and
punish actors that renege from agreed upon procedures.
To enforce procedures, CONFERS can encourage participants
to bring their issues to an independent third party. Although this
form of conciliation is nonbinding, actors involved in CONFERS
might be willing to adhere to the third party’s findings
and recommendations. After all, CONFERS was created to give
structure to this industry, so its participants will likely want to
maintain the structure by following agreed upon policies and
procedures. However, if conciliation before an independent third
party does not work, CONFERS can, again, borrow the Kimberley
Process’s delisting procedure. The economic risk associated with
being delisted is likely high enough to keep actors from defying
CONFERS’s policies.
If both conciliation and delisting procedures are not enough to
keep actors in line, the Liability Convention provides a means of
bringing claims against states that cause damage in outer space
and on the surface of the Earth.202 Any damage that may result
from a violation of a soft law rule or regulation would then be
actionable under this treaty.203 Thus, through a combination of
soft law and hard law, RPO regulation is enforceable and
punishable against state and nonstate actors under a delisting
procedure and is enforceable and punishable against state actors
under the Liability Convention.204
201
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C. What CONFERS Can Learn from the Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process has proved to be an effective soft law
measure in regulating the blood diamond regime. CONFERS, or
any other soft law mechanism, can learn from the benefits and
detriments of the Kimberley Process because both the RPO
industry and the blood diamond regime present major security
issues that state and nonstate actors alike need to address.
First, the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process is the main
reason that it is effective in regulating the issue of conflict
diamonds in Southern Africa.205 Both state and nonstate actors
involved in eradicating the blood diamond regime have a sense of
assurance that they are not importing and exporting blood
diamonds or selling blood diamonds to their customers.206 This
sense of assurance comes from the fact that the process was
created by industry leaders.207 A process created by industry
leaders implies that the process is “practical and workable.”208
RPO industry leaders, through CONFERS, are collaborating
to create practical and workable standards under which state and
nonstate actors can operate.209 As demonstrated by the Kimberley
Process, such an endeavor will likely lead to a sense of legitimacy
and assurance that a treaty may not necessarily provide. Treaties
are created and implemented solely by states that might not ask
nonstate actors that are more directly involved in the industry to
engage in the treaty-making process.210 Therefore, there is a
chance that a new treaty regulating RPO use may not incorporate
the best practices and standards of the industry.211 Thus, a new
treaty may not have the sense of legitimacy that policies created
by CONFERS may have, because that “legitimacy lies in large part
with the fact that it is a product of the . . . industry itself.”212
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The Kimberley Process has other means that increase
its legitimacy and efficacy. Primarily, participant states are
obligated to “enact domestic legislation allowing for the imposition
of the terms of the Kimberley Process, which will combat conflict
diamonds within the participant’s jurisdiction.”213 If CONFERS is
successful in creating soft law policies, the industry leaders
involved could require similar domestic legislation to ensure that
the rules and regulations are being enforced. This method could
further obviate the need for a new multilateral treaty governing
RPO use: once state and nonstate actors are controlled by
domestic law, they have a legal incentive to obey the international
soft law measures.214
Further, participant states of the Kimberley Process can be
delisted for violating the terms of the process.215 Delisting can
damage a violating state’s economy, because diamonds cannot be
legally imported or exported through a delisted state—this
increases the process’s validity.216 Such a public punishment for
violation is a good incentive for state and nonstate actors to obey
the soft law.217 Once a state has been delisted, it can be re-enlisted
if the state remedies the issue that caused it to be delisted.218
If the RPO industry turns to soft law measures for regulation,
it too could use this delisting and re-enlisting process. This
method would likely prove to be an effective incentive for state and
nonstate actors to obey the rules and regulations. States would
not want to be delisted because it would hurt their economy and it
would publicly shame them. Nonviolating states would likely
distrust the violating state and would hesitate before conducting
any joint space activity. Further, nonstate actors would not want
to be delisted because customers would likely hesitate before
turning to them for satellite refueling and repairing missions.
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This practice of delisting and re-enlisting would show that the
creators of the soft law measure are devoted to solving the security
issues associated with RPO use.219
Ultimately, the Kimberley Process shows us that soft law is
an adaptable way to manage both state and nonstate actors
operating in outer space. Soft law eradicates the need for hard
law, especially in light of the difficulties associated with
treaty-making, the technological advancements associated with
RPOs, and the need to have nonstate actors involved in
policy-making to make such policies effective. The Kimberley
Process, however, also demonstrates the disadvantages of soft law
from which CONFERS can learn from the Process’s mistakes.
The main issue with the Kimberley Process is that it relies
heavily upon self-policing by both the states and the companies
involved.220 Despite the support and approval of the United
Nations, the Kimberley Process has no international monitoring
body.221 Domestic legislation passed by participating states of the
Kimberley Process is the only legally binding requirement of the
process.222 But domestic legislation requires domestic enforcement
with the state’s police power—this monitoring method can be
irregular depending on the state.223 This results in inadequate
and “toothless” monitoring, making the Kimberley Process
somewhat ineffective.224
To combat such a problem with RPO soft law regulation,
CONFERS could request impartial oversight from the United
Nations.225 The United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
(“UNOOSA”) has the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (“COPUOS”).226 This committee could further its
monitoring reach to include monitoring soft law regulation of
RPOs. COPUOS, acting under the UNOOSA, would have power
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to sanction states that do not comply with the soft law rules
and regulations of RPO use, thereby giving RPO regulation
more teeth.227
In connection with the lack of international oversight, the
Kimberley Process “does not permit a private right of action
whereby an individual can bring suit against another person or
company violating the [process].”228 A private right of action would
incentivize industry members to more actively participate in
eliminating the blood diamond trade out of fear of litigation,
creating another “check” on the system.229 It would serve as an
incentive for participating states to stay committed to the
Kimberley Process.230
RPO regulation through soft law cannot itself create a private
right of action because soft law is inherently nonbinding.231
However, the delisting process, again, would likely be incentive
enough for state and nonstate actors to comply with RPO rules
and regulations. The economic risk of disobeying industry-wide
regulations created by CONFERS would likely instill enough fear
in businesses to comply with such regulations.
If the threat of being delisted is not enough incentive, the
Liability Convention could create a private right of action for state
actors to seek relief.232 If an actor violates the soft law rules and
regulations of RPO use, resulting in damage to another state’s
property on the Earth’s surface or in outer space, then that
damage could be actionable under the Liability Convention.233
Although the Liability Convention only provides for claims
between states, launching states are liable for outer space mishaps
to nonstate actors.234 Thus, a state could get relief from another
state for a nonstate actor’s damage.235 While the Kimberley
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Process shows the downsides of using soft law, CONFERS can
learn from the Process’s mistakes to make its own policies and
procedures more effective.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, soft law has many advantages over hard law:
soft law is easier to form compared to the treaty-making process
required in hard law, non-space-faring nations are unwilling to
join existing space treaties, soft law is a more malleable
instrument for changing technologies as opposed to renegotiating
treaties, and nonstate actors are more actively involved in creating
soft law policies. However, soft law does have some disadvantages
compared to hard law: soft law is less credible than hard law
because hard law requires codification of legally binding
obligations, and soft law lacks enforcement and punishment
mechanisms.
The disadvantages of using soft law for RPO regulation can be
mitigated. CONFERS’s policies could become more credible if they
are widespread and consistently used, which could convert the
policies into binding customary international law.
Since
customary international law is not binding on nonstate actors,
CONFERS could further heighten the credibility of their policies
by including a delisting and re-enlisting procedure, similar to the
Kimberley Process, that would promote compliance. To diminish
the lack of enforcement and punishment mechanisms under soft
law, CONFERS could encourage participants to use a conciliatory
method and bring their issues to an independent third party. If
conciliation does not work, CONFERS could, again, utilize a
delisting procedure to punish violating entities. If delisting is not
enough, the Liability Convention provides a right of action if a
breach of RPO rules resulted in damage to a space object on
Earth’s surface or in outer space.
The Kimberley Process further demonstrates the benefits and
detriments of a soft law system from which CONFERS and the
RPO industry can learn. The Kimberley Process demonstrates
that using soft law to manage a security issue has its advantages
over hard law: soft law integrates industry leaders, as opposed to
just state actors, to create rules and regulations, which increases
legitimacy; soft law creators can mandate domestic legislation
pursuant to the rules and regulations, which increases
compliance; and delisting and re-enlisting procedures can be
enacted, which also increases compliance.
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However, the Kimberley Process shows that there are some
drawbacks in using soft law to regulate a security issue: soft law
requires no international monitoring body, which limits
compliance; and soft law does not provide a private right of action
for any breach of the rules and regulations, which limits
punishment. CONFERS can learn from the Kimberley Process’s
downfalls and implement more oversight to mitigate the
disadvantages of this soft law process. First, CONFERS could
require domestic legislation to be passed in participating states
pursuant to the soft law rules and regulation, making the rules
and regulations binding on state and nonstate actors, which would
increase compliance and punishment. Second, CONFERS could
request impartial oversight from the UNOOSA under the
COPUOS, which also would increase compliance and punishment.
Overall, soft law is the better method to manage RPO
regulation. Any drawbacks with soft law can be counteracted with
varying solutions, as demonstrated by the Kimberley Process.
Satellite owners would likely prefer to protect their assets with
uniformly agreed upon rules that they helped create than continue
with the lawlessness that currently exists. Soft law is the most
effective method to give such structure to the amorphous RPO
industry.

